Saknar du också en enkel introduktion till Greklands finanskris? I en serie inlägg som publiceras här på bloggen diskuteras många av de frågor och påstående som Greklandskrisen givit upphov till. Vanliga påstående granskas och sätts i sitt sammanhang. Texterna är hämtade från «Sell your islands, you bankrupt Greeks»: 20 popular fallacies concerning the debt crisis, utgiven av Rosa Luxemburgstiftelsen. Texten utgår från Tysklands roll, men mycket av det förekommer i den tyska diskussionen har förekommit i svensk press också.

«GREECE HAS TOO MUCH DEBTS»

The facts: Because of the financial crisis, Greece’s national debt grew between 2007 and the end of 2010 from 115 % to 143 % of economic performance (Gross Domestic Product, GDP). This so-called debt ratio will probably climb above the 150 % mark in 2011. By way of comparison: Germany’s debt ratio is about 85 %.

Context: The high debt ratio alone does not explain Greece’s problems. «There is no adequate debt ratio, neither in theory nor in practice.»(1) Italy has a debt ratio of 120 %, Japan has even reached 200 % of its GDP. Neither of these is seen to be «broke», while Greece is. Why? Because the financial markets are speculating on Greece becoming bankrupt. This has driven the interest rate for new debts to such high levels, that Athens cannot borrow any new money(2). By comparison: Athens must pay 25% interest on two year government bonds, Italy only 3% and Japan a mere 0.2 % (as per end of May 2011).The problem therefore lies with the interest rate that has been forced upwards by finance market speculations. The Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK) has calculated that, if the average rate of interest for Greek state loans would fall to 3 %, then the country’s debt ratio would fall to 110 % of GDP by the year 2015.(3) However, if the interest rate re- mains as high as it is, Athens will not be able to borrow any money on the markets. Whether or not it is then «broke» depends on the willing- ness of the other Euro-states to help it out by providing loans. There- fore, the question of «bankruptcy» is a question of political decisions by governments.

Källor i texten

(1) BHF-Bankeconomic service, 4.6.2011

(2) One simplified example to demonstrate how this works: Greece borrows a loan of 1 million euros at a fixed rate of interest of 5 % p.a. (=50,000 euros). The bond is then traded on the stock exchange and crashes. Its price falls from 1 million euros to 500,000 euros. The interest rate of 5 % (=50.000 euros) however remains unchanged. Ergo, the bond now has a yield for investment for the lender of 10 % (50,000 euros from 500,000 euros). If Athens now wants to take out a new loan, the interest rate that it has to pay is based on the yield for investment of the old loan. If it wants to borrow new money, this means that Greece must offer the lenders an interest rate of 10%.

(3) IMK:Debtcutsbringmoredisadvantagesthan advantages, May 2010.

Engelsk text: Stephan Kaufmann: «Sell your islands, you bankrupt Greeks»: 20 popular fallacies concerning the debt crisis, utgiven av Rosa Luxemburgstiftelsen. Sid 3

Greklands kris är en kris för hela Euro-samarbetet. Om valutan ska vara stabil förutsätter det att de länder Euron vilar på också är stabila. Därför påverkar utvecklingen i Grekland framtiden för hela Euro-samarbetet. Ovanstående text fokuserar på Tysklands roll som är den största aktören inom EMU. Men alla länder inom EMU tvingas ta ställning till hur krisen ska lösas och det finns flera alternativ. Om detta har Erik Bengtsson, skrivet två omfattande inlägg: Grekisk hjärngympa och uppföljande Mer om Europas kris här på bloggen.